Decriminalizing Delinquency: The Effect of Raising the Age of Majority on Juvenile Recidivism by Loeffler, Charles E. & Grunwald, Ben
361
[ Journal of Legal Studies, vol. 44 (June 2015)]
© 2015 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. 0047-2530/2015/4402-0023$10.00
Decriminalizing Delinquency: The Effect 
of Raising the Age of Majority on Juvenile 
Recidivism
Charles E. Loeffler and Ben Grunwald
ABSTRACT
In the last decade, a number of states have expanded the jurisdiction of their juvenile courts 
by increasing the maximum age to 18. Proponents argue that these expansions reduce crime by 
increasing access to the beneficial features of the juvenile justice system. Critics counter that 
the expansions risk increasing crime by reducing deterrence. In 2010, Illinois raised the maxi-
mum age for juvenile court for offenders who commit a misdemeanor. By examining the effect 
of this law on juvenile offenders in Chicago, this paper provides the first empirical estimates of 
the consequences of recent legislative activity to raise the age of criminal majority. Applying 
a difference-in-differences design with multiple control groups, we find little evidence of an 
effect. Our results suggest that—contrary to the expectations of both advocates and oppo-
nents—increasing the maximum age for juvenile court does not affect juvenile recidivism.
1. INTRODUCTION
Historically, children over 14 have been presumptively culpable for their 
crimes. In the late 19th century, juvenile justice reformers advocated for 
the creation of a separate judicial system that emphasized rehabilitation 
rather than punishment and judicial discretion rather than procedural 
formality. This movement was driven by concerns that juvenile offenders 
were different from adult offenders and might benefit from alternative 
forms of judicial processing (Tanenhaus 2002, 2004). The juvenile court 
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system spread rapidly throughout the United States. Just a generation af-
ter the first was established in Illinois in 1899, juvenile courts could be 
found in nearly all 50 states (McCord, Widom, and Crowell 2001).
Despite this rapid and widespread adoption, the juvenile justice sys-
tem began contracting in the 1970s. Growing fears of juvenile crime and 
skepticism about rehabilitation led many states to reconsider the wisdom 
of processing juveniles with serious offenses in what appeared to be a le-
nient juvenile justice system (Feld 1999; Fox 1996; Zimring 1998; Cook 
and Laub 2002). States moved more and more juveniles into the adult 
justice system through three kinds of legislative changes. They created 
statutes that required or permitted juvenile judges to transfer adolescents 
with serious offenses to adult court. They created direct-file procedures, 
which empowered prosecutors to charge juveniles with serious offenses 
in adult court without judicial approval. And a number of states low-
ered the maximum age for juvenile court—often called the age of major-
ity—for some or all offenses. Taken together, these changes precipitated 
a large-scale recriminalization of juvenile offending, transferring tens of 
thousands of cases each year to the adult criminal justice system (Rubin 
2003, P2-2).
We are now beginning to see another shift in the tides. There is sig-
nificant expansionist advocacy to push the age of majority back up to 
18 and, thus, to bring offenders between the ages of 16 and 18 back into 
the juvenile court system (Brown 2012; Moore 2011; Schwartz 2013). 
Several states, including Illinois, Connecticut, Mississippi, Massachusetts, 
and New Hampshire, have already done so.
Empirical questions play an important role in the public debate on 
age-of-majority legislation. Proponents argue that raising the age, and 
thus expanding the juvenile justice system, will reduce crime by increas-
ing access to treatment opportunities and by decreasing the harmful ef-
fects of processing juveniles in the adult system (for example, victimiza-
tion and public criminal records) (Ingram 2007; Hlavach 2013; Chicago 
Sun-Times 2013; Ferdinand 2002; Dixon 2009; Byrd 2008; Amelinckx 
and Redmond 2013). They further argue that the decrease in crime will 
offset the increased costs of processing additional juveniles in the more 
expensive juvenile justice system (Henrichson and Levshin 2011; Morse 
2007; Roman 2006; Timberlake 2009). Opponents counter that older 
teenagers engaged in serious offending are more appropriately handled 
in the adult system (Lord 2008) and that raise-the-age legislation may 
increase juvenile crime rates (Birckhead 2008; Backus 2011) and burden 
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state budgets with the higher costs of juvenile processing (Wiser 2009; 
Morse 2007).
This paper explores these empirical questions by providing the first 
estimates of the effect of recent raise-the-age legislation on juvenile re-
cidivism. In 2010, Illinois raised the age of majority for misdemeanor 
crimes from 17 to 18. As a result, 17-year-old offenders charged with a 
mis demeanor who would have been processed in the adult system before 
2010 are now processed in the juvenile system. We apply a difference- 
in-differences (DID) design to estimate the effect of the law on the re-
cidivism of 17-year-old arrestees. We compare the change in recidivism 
among 17-year-old arrestees before and after 2010 with the change in 
recidivism among 16- and 18-year-old arrestees (who were unaffected by 
the change in law) during that same period. The results suggest that—
contrary to the expectations of both its advocates and opponents—the 
change in law had no effect on recidivism.
To ensure the robustness of our results, we apply the DID design to 
two different subsamples of the data. First, we fitted the model to the 
subset of suspects arrested within 60 days of their 17th or 18th birth-
day. Second, we fitted the model to a subset of suspects arrested within 
60 days of the change in law (January 1, 2010). Both of these alterna-
tive specifications increase the comparability of the treatment and control 
groups and remove some potential unobserved sources of bias.
Our analysis improves on the research design of prior studies and re-
inforces and extends their findings. First, prior studies of changes to the 
jurisdiction of the juvenile court have formed control groups with juve-
niles from other states or juveniles of substantially different ages in the 
same state. Our detailed individual-level data permit control groups of 
offenders from the same city who are no more than 120 days apart in 
age. Second, the few studies that use better-matched control groups (for 
example, Hjalmarsson 2009; Lee and McCrary 2009) examine time pe-
riods during which there is no change to the jurisdiction of the juvenile 
court. Our study strengthens the causal inference in prior work by com-
bining a plausible control group with a change to the age of majority. 
Third, our study examines the effect of raise-the-age legislation on the 
subset of juveniles who are arrested and processed and who thus expe-
rience firsthand the effects of the law. Our results suggest that offend-
ing rates remain unchanged even for this subset of juveniles. Fourth, our 
study extends the findings of prior research to a new population. Until 
now, scholars have evaluated the effect of changing the age of majority 
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only for serious felonies, yet misdemeanors account for the vast majority 
of all juvenile offenses.
2. PRIOR LITERATURE
Two areas of academic research provide evidence on the effects of raising 
the age of majority on juvenile crime. The first examines the effect on ag-
gregate offending of legislative enactments that shrank the jurisdiction of 
the juvenile justice system during the contractionary period that began in 
the 1970s.
Singer and McDowall (1988) use an interrupted-time-series design to 
examine the effect of a 1978 New York State law that lowered the age 
of exclusive jurisdiction for the juvenile court to 13 for the most serious 
charges (namely, murder, kidnapping, rape, burglary, robbery, and ag-
gravated assault). The authors use 13- to 15-year-olds in New York as 
the treatment group and use 16- to 19-year-olds in New York and 13- to 
15-year-olds in Philadelphia as controls. Jensen and Metsger (1994) ex-
amine the effect of a 1981 law in Idaho that required juveniles between
the ages of 14 and 18 charged with serious crimes (namely, murder, rob-
bery, forcible rape, and mayhem) to be transferred to the adult system.
The authors compare the rate of total juvenile arrests in Idaho in the 4
years before and after the statute was enacted with the rate of total juve-
nile arrests during that period in Wyoming and Montana. Risler, Sweat-
man, and Nackerud (1998) examine the effect of a 1994 Georgia law
requiring the transfer of juveniles over 13 years of age who were charged
with the most serious criminal offenses (namely, murder, manslaughter,
rape, child molestation, and armed robbery). The authors compare the
total juvenile arrest rates in Georgia in the 2 years before and after the
law went into effect. A final study examines the effect of direct-file stat-
utes (Steiner and Wright 2006), which empower prosecutors to transfer
juveniles with serious offenses to the adult system without judicial ap-
proval. The authors apply a multiple-interrupted time-series model, com-
paring the juvenile arrest rates for violent crimes in the 14 states that
enacted  direct-file statutes and the 10 states that did not. The four studies
find little evidence of a deterrent effect on the targeted offenses.
Taken together, the null findings in the literature provide little evi-
dence that the location of the age boundary between the juvenile and 
adult systems has a large effect on juvenile offending (Bishop 2000; Red-
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ding 2010). However, two methodological limitations temper this con-
clusion. First, the counterfactuals used in this literature are limited. One 
study uses 16- to 19-year-olds in the same state as controls for 13- to 
15-year-olds and also uses 13- to 15-year-olds in a similar jurisdiction.
Another study does not use a control group, and two use juveniles in
states that did not enact a transfer or direct-file statute as controls. It is
difficult to determine whether these control groups provide valid infor-
mation about the trend the treatment groups would have taken in the
absence of the relevant legislative enactment. Second, prior work on leg-
islative changes to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court examines only the
offending rate for all juveniles and not the recidivism of juveniles who are
arrested. It is reasonable to expect a greater effect on the subset of juve-
niles who are arrested and processed, as only they experience the effects
of the law firsthand.
While no studies have yet examined the effect on recidivism of a legis-
lative change that raises or lowers the age of majority for all misdemeanor 
or felony crimes, a related literature compares the recidivism of juveniles 
transferred to the adult system with those retained in the juvenile system. 
In one of the earliest studies, Fagan (1996) examines reoffending among 
juveniles arrested for robbery and burglary in two adjacent jurisdictions 
with different age thresholds for mandatory transfer. After controlling 
for differences in observable case characteristics (for example, sex, race, 
number of prior offenses, age at first offense, and offense severity), Fagan 
finds that 15- and 16-year-old robbery suspects tried as adults in New 
York City were 18 percent more likely than robbery suspects tried as ju-
veniles in New Jersey to be rearrested. No effect was observed for bur-
glary suspects.
Bishop and colleagues have published several studies comparing the 
recidivism rates of juveniles who are transferred to the adult system with 
those who are not (Bishop et al. 1996; Winner et al. 1997). In one study 
(Bishop et al. 1996), they match transferred and nontransferred juveniles 
on observable covariates (for example, number of prior offenses, offense 
seriousness, sex, race, and age). The authors find that 1-year rearrest 
rates among transferred juveniles were 22 percent higher. Except with re-
spect to property offenders, the authors report similar results in a 7-year 
follow-up study (Winner et al. 1997, p. 558).
More recent matching studies examine a wider range of offenses cov-
ered by transfer statutes. They find higher recidivism rates among trans-
ferred youth (Myers 2003; Lanza-Kaduce et al. 2005; Fagan, Kupchik, 
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and Liberman 2007) and some evidence of treatment effect heterogeneity 
(Loughran et al. 2010; Fagan, Kupchik, and Liberman 2007).
It is difficult to determine whether these differences between trans-
ferred and nontransferred juveniles reflect a true effect of transfer or 
merely unobserved selection bias (McGowan et al. 2007; Mulvey and 
Schubert 2012). To address this concern, scholars have applied a regres-
sion discontinuity design. Recognizing that nearly all adolescents under 
18 years of age arrested in Florida are processed in the juvenile system 
and nearly all adolescents over 18 are processed in the adult system, Lee 
and McCrary (2009) examine adolescents who were arrested just a few 
weeks before and a few weeks after their 18th birthday. The authors re-
port relatively little evidence that processing juveniles in the adult system 
has a large effect on recidivism, a finding echoed by a similar regression 
discontinuity studies (Hjalmarsson 2009; Loeffler and Grunwald 2015).
Taken together, most studies of recidivism find that processing juve-
niles in the adult system increases recidivism, albeit with significant ev-
idence of effect heterogeneity. This empirical result has played an im-
portant role in contemporary debates about age-of-majority reform. 
Advocates frequently cite the higher recidivism rates among juveniles 
transferred to the adult justice system as justification for raising the age of 
majority for all juvenile offenders (Ingram 2007; Hlavach 2013; Chicago 
Sun-Times 2013; Ferdinand 2002; Dixon 2009; Byrd 2008; Amelinckx 
and Redmond 2013). Similarly, scholars suggest that a higher age of 
majority should produce lower rates of recidivism (Cauffman 2012; 
Farrington, Loeber, and Howell 2012), with some scholars further sug-
gesting that the observed double-digit differences in recidivism between 
transferred and nontransferred juveniles could be mirrored by similar 
reductions in recidivism if the age of majority is raised for all offenses 
(Deitch, Breeden, and Weingarten 2012; Henrichson and Levshin 2011; 
Roman 2006).
The applicability of previous research findings to the contemporary 
policy discussion, however, is unknown given their focus on transferred 
juveniles, who represent a small fraction of all juvenile offenders. In 
2010, for example, less than 1 percent of all juvenile court petitions and 
less than 1 percent of all delinquency cases resulted in a waiver to the 
adult system (Puzzanchera and Robson 2014). The results from the liter-
ature on transferred juveniles may not, therefore, generalize to the larger 
population of juvenile offenders charged with a felony or misdemeanor 
who are affected by legislation that raises the age of majority for all of-
fenders charged with a felony or misdemeanor.
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3. RESEARCH AND METHODS
3.1. Data
The data for this study were requested and received from the Research 
and Evaluation Division of the Chicago Police Department in early 2013. 
The data cover all arrests from January 1999 until February 2013. They 
include the following information for each arrest: the date of arrest, the 
most serious offense charged, and the date of birth, gender, and race of 
the arrestee. We exclude all arrests that lack a fingerprint identification 
number, a charge grade, or a birth date in the data. The remaining obser-
vations consist of 22,779 misdemeanor arrests of 16-, 17-, and 18-year-
olds between the years 2009 and 2010. We use data on cases from before 
2009 to provide descriptive trends for recidivism before the law went into 
effect.
We created a binary outcome variable indicating whether an individ-
ual was rearrested by the Chicago Police Department within 2 years of 
the recorded offense. We also created a second outcome variable indicat-
ing whether an individual was rearrested for a violent crime.1 Our 2-year 
follow-up period represents a compromise between several competing 
methodological considerations. First, the observed effect of a treatment 
can vary depending on the follow-up period, and longer follow-up peri-
ods are usually preferable. As the change in law went into effect on Jan-
uary 1, 2010, and our data include all arrests until the end of 2012, the 
longest possible follow-up period is 3 years. Second, to avoid censoring 
problems, all subjects must have an equal period of time to recidivate af-
ter the initial arrest. Third, a longer follow-up period disqualifies subjects 
from the potential analysis sample because of censoring. As a reasonable 
trade-off of these considerations, we use a 2-year follow-up period, which 
allows all arrestees in 2010 to be included in the analysis.
We also calculate the number of days until subjects are rearrested to 
assess whether timing varies across subgroups in our sample. An analysis 
of timing may provide some insight into theoretical mechanisms. For ex-
ample, if pretrial detention or incarceration affects one group more than 
the others, we would expect to see delays in the time to rearrest.
1. Violent crimes include homicide, robbery, aggravated assault, simple assault, and
sexual assault.
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3.2. Analytic Strategy
On January 1, 2010, Illinois raised the criminal age of majority for mis-
demeanor crimes from 17 to 18. Before that date, 17-year-olds arrested 
for a misdemeanor were prosecuted in the adult criminal justice system. 
Since that date, they have been processed in the juvenile system. The law 
did not affect 16- or 18-year-old arrestees. To verify that the law was im-
plemented as enacted, we graph the monthly probability of juvenile case 
disposition postarrest for 16-, 17-, and 18-year-olds from January 2009 
until December 2010 (Figure 1). Consistent with the change in law, the 
probability of juvenile case disposition (that is, juvenile station adjust-
ment, referral to juvenile court, or detention in a juvenile facility) went 
from 0 to nearly 1 immediately after the law was implemented, while 
the probabilities of juvenile case disposition for 16- and 18-year-olds re-
mained unchanged at 1 and 0, respectively.
We apply a DID design to pooled cross sections over time to estimate 
the effect of Illinois’s raise-the-age legislation on recidivism in Chicago. 
Such DID designs have been used extensively to evaluate changes in pol-
icy that affect some but not all units subject to similar conditions (Card 
1992; Gruber 2000). In our first set of DID models, we compare the 
change in the rearrest rate of 17-year-old arrestees (the treatment group) 
from 2009 to 2010 with the change in the rearrest rate of 18-year-olds 
(the control group) during that period. The model is as follows:
 0 1 2 3Age17 Year2010 Age17 Year2010 1), (i i i i i iY b b b b mD = + + + ´ +  (1)
where Yi is a 2-year measure of rearrest for arrested suspect i, Age17i is 
a dummy variable indicating that the arrested suspect was 17 years old, 
Year2010i is a dummy variable indicating that the arrest took place in 
2010, b0 reflects the average rearrest rate for 18-year-olds in 2009, bi cap-
tures differences between 17- and 18-year-olds before the policy change, 
b2 captures the difference between the probability of rearrest in 2009 and 
2010 for 18-year-olds, and b3 is the relevant DID estimate of the effect 
of the law on recidivism. We estimate these models using ordinary least 
squares regression on the subpopulation of 17- and 18-year-olds arrested 
in 2009 and 2010 (Angrist and Pischke 2009).
In our second set of models, we use 16-year-olds rather than 18-year-
olds as the control group. In these models, the relevant treatment group 
is 17-year-olds arrested in 2010, and b0 reflects the average rearrest rate 
for 16-year-olds in 2009, b1 captures any differences between 16- and 
17-year-olds before the policy change, b2 captures the difference between
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Figure 1. Probability of juvenile case disposition
the probability of rearrest in 2009 and 2010 for 16-year-olds, and b3 is 
the relevant DID estimate of the effect of the law on recidivism as it cap-
tures the difference between reoffending for 16- and 17-year-olds.
The primary assumption in the DID context is that of parallel trends: 
no nontreatment variables should change during the study period that 
affect the recidivism of one group differently than the other. Because of 
differences in developmental maturation, it is possible that differences 
between 17-year-olds and 16- and 18-year-olds introduce bias into the 
model.
We assess the plausibility of using 16- and 18-year-olds as controls for 
17-year-olds in two ways. First, we check for balance on pretreatment
covariates. Table 1 provides a comparison of pretreatment covariates for
17- and 18-year-olds arrested in 2009. Although there are statistically
significant differences, Table 1 shows that 17- and 18-year-olds are rel-
atively similar in terms of demographic characteristics and the composi-
tion of charges for which they are arrested. As a general rule of thumb,
standardized mean differences of .1 or less suggest adequate balance. The
standardized mean differences for nearly all covariates in Table 1 are be-
low or just above .1. Seventeen-year-old arrestees are slightly less likely to
be male and white and commit slightly more violent and property crimes.
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But Table 1 also shows a substantial difference in arrest history between 
17- and 18-year-olds. Eighteen-year-olds tend to have, on average, one
more prior arrest than 17-year-olds because they have had 1 more year
of adolescence to commit crimes. The same general patterns are observed
when comparing 16-year-olds with 17-year-olds (see Table A1 in the on-
line appendix).
Second, we assess whether the recidivism of 17-year-olds follows a 
trend over time similar to that of 16- and 18-year-olds. Figure 2 pres-
ents the average rates of recidivism by age of juveniles arrested over time. 
There are a few periods when the trends diverge. There are also small 
differences in the level of each curve on the Y-axis. However, in general, 
the 16- and 18-year-olds tend to follow the same general trend as the 
17-year-olds.
Together, the comparison of pretreatment covariates and the assess-
ment of trends over time suggest that 16- and 18-year-olds may be ap-
propriate control groups for 17-year-olds, but there are some nontrivial 
differences. To improve the comparability of the treatment and control 
groups, we fitted the DID models to two different subsets of the data. 
First, we fitted an age-limited model. When using 18-year-olds as the con-
trol group, we fitted the DID model to subjects arrested within 60 days of 
their 18th birthday. When using 16-year-olds as the control group, we fit-
ted the DID model to subjects arrested within 60 days of their 17th birth-
Table 1. Comparison of Characteristics: 17- and 18-Year-Olds Arrested in 2009
Mean SD
Mean
Standardized 
Mean 
17 18 17  18 Difference Difference t- Test
Male .845 .857 .362 .350 −.012 −.034 .060
White .285 .300 .451 .458 −.015 −.034 .062
Black .709 .695 .454 .461 .014 .032 .080
Other race .005 .004 .072 .065 .001 .014 .433
Total priors 4.972 6.140 6.111 7.185 −1.168 −.175 .000
Property crime .192 .189 .394 .392 .003 .007 .678
Violent crime .200 .157 .400 .364 .043 .113 .000
Drug crime .254 .308 .436 .462 −.054 −.120 .000
Other crime .354 .346 .478 .476 .008 .017 .353
Recidivism within 
2 years .753 .731 .431 .443 .022 .050 .005
Arrest days before 
or after 17th 
birthday 183.8 176.6 105.1 106.1 7.2 .068 0
Note. N = 6,479 17-year-olds and 5,845 18-year-olds.
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day. This ensures that any two juveniles in the model are no more than 
120 days apart in age. The vast majority of subjects are closer in age.
Table 2 compares the pretreatment covariates for 17- and 18-year-
olds in the age-limited models and shows improved balance on most co-
variates. Most important, the substantial difference in criminal history 
observed in Table 1 virtually disappears, and the standardized mean dif-
ferences are all well below .1. The results are substantively similar when 
comparing 17- and 16-year-olds arrested within 60 days of their 17th 
birthday (see Table A2 in the online appendix).
Figures 3 and 4 present the trends in recidivism for the 17- and 
18-year-olds and the 17- and 16-year-olds in the age-restricted models,
respectively. Figure 3 shows that the 17- and 18-year-olds are on the
same level on the Y-axis and have a very similar trend over time. The di-
vergence in trends between 2003 and 2005 is likely the result of statistical
error due to a smaller sample size. The trends for the 17- and 16-year-
olds in the age- restricted models also track each other (Figure 4) but per-
haps less well.
We also examined the number of suspects arrested 60 days before and 
60 days after their 17th or 18th birthday to test for any shifts in density 
that might coincide with the 2010 change in law (see Figures A1 and 
Figure 2. Average recidivism rates
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A2 in the online appendix). We do observe a subtle shift. A stable gap 
in arrests between those just under 17 and those just over 17 closes af-
ter 2010. Similarly, a stable gap in arrests between those just under 18 
and those just over 18 emerges after 2010. This pattern suggests that the 
change in law may trigger some selection processes in the decision to ar-
rest, but they appear pseudorandom given the absence of any covariate 
imbalance in Tables 2 and A2. We suspect that this trend may be due to 
a lack of interest among a subset of officers in arresting juvenile offend-
ers for misdemeanors or to jurisdictional differences in charging practices 
and standards. This shift in the number of arrestees is a cause for con-
cern, but the near-perfect covariate balance suggests that comparable ju-
veniles were arrested on either side of the age threshold both before and 
after 2010.
As a further check on the robustness of our estimates, we also fitted a 
time-limited model. We fitted the DID model on arrests that took place 
within 60 days of January 1, 2010, the date the law went into effect. 
Restricting the data to this 60-day window may help remove bias result-
ing from secular trends over time. However, it is also possible that the 
time-restricted subsample biases the model downward if the Chicago Po-
Table 2. Comparison of Characteristics: 17- and 18-Year-Olds Arrested in 2009 within 60 
Days of Their 18th Birthday
Mean SD
Mean
Standardized 
Mean 
17 18 17  18 Difference Difference t-Test
Male .840 .851 .367 .356 −.011 −.032 .466
White .312 .301 .463 .459 .011 .023 .598
Black .679 .692 .467 .462 −.013 −.029 .505
Other race .009 .006 .092 .075 .003 .034 .430
Total priors 5.885 6.188 7.372 7.016 −.303 −.042 .333
Property crime .218 .208 .413 .406 .010 .024 .577
Violent crime .174 .172 .380 .378 .002 .006 .899
Drug crime .247 .276 .431 .447 −.029 −.065 .135
Other crime .360 .344 .480 .475 .016 .035 .426
Recidivism within 
2 years .738 .742 .440 .438 −.004 −.010 .811
Arrest days before 
or after  17th 
birthday 30.5 28.7 17.3 17.5 1.8 .104 .017
N 1,049 1,056
Note. N = 1,049 17-year-olds and 1,056 18-year-olds.
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
Figure 3. Recidivism of 17- and 18-year-olds within 60 days of their 18th birthday
Figure 4. Recidivism of 16- and 17-year-olds within 60 days of their 17th birthday
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lice Department did not fully implement the law in the first 60 days of 
2010.
4. RESULTS
Table 3 presents the results of the models that use 18-year-olds as con-
trols for 17-year-olds. The full model includes all 17- and 18-year-olds. 
The primary finding of interest is the interaction of Age17 and Year2010, 
which estimates the effect of the change in law. The full model shows 
that the effect of the law is essentially 0 and statistically insignificant. 
For the results of the age-limited model, with just those subjects arrested 
within 60 days of their 18th birthday, the coefficient is slightly larger, but 
it remains small and statistically insignificant. For the time-limited model, 
with 17- and 18-year-olds arrested within 60 days of January 1, 2010, 
the day the law went into effect, the coefficient of interest is negative and 
slightly larger than the estimates in the other models, but it remains small 
and statistically insignificant.
Table 4 presents substantively similar results for our models that use 
16-year-olds as controls for 17-year-olds. The estimated coefficients are
Table 3. Models for Any Rearrest, with 18-Year-Olds as Controls
Full 
(N = 23,576)
Age Limited 
(N = 4,009)
Time Limited 
(N = 3,566)
Variable b P b P b P
Intercept .731** 0 .742** 0 .712** 0
(.006) (.013) (.016)
[.743] [.768] [.743]
Age17 .022** .005 −.005 .808 .046* .03
(.008) (.019) (.021)
[.037] [.032] [.088]
Year2010 .003 .668 .011 .553 .021 .324
(.008) (.019) (.022)
[.019] [.049] [.064]
Age17 × Year2010 .010 .366 .027 .325 −.044 .138
(.011) (.027) (.030)
[.033] [.081] [.014]
Note. Standard errors are in parentheses. Values in brackets represent the upper bound of 
the 95 percent confidence interval for the coefficient.
* P < .05.
** P < .01.
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
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small and statistically insignificant, with all but the age-limited model be-
tween .01 and .00 in magnitude. Reestimating each of the models in Ta-
bles 3 and 4 with covariates produces nearly identical results (see Tables 
A5 and A6 in the online appendix).
Given the high rates of rearrest observed in our sample, we also exam-
ine the timing of rearrest using Cox proportional hazard models with the 
same variables as in our DID models. Figure 5 shows the probability of 
survival for 17-year-olds arrested in 2010 along with values for each of 
the three comparison groups. Comparing 16-year-olds with 17-year-olds 
and 17-year-olds with 18-year-olds in our age-limited models (see Table 
A7 in the online appendix), we find that there are no statistically signifi-
cant differences in the timing of recidivism.
We next examine whether our model estimates of rearrest vary by the 
length of the follow-up period, starting with a 6-month follow-up and 
extending it to a full 24-month follow-up. Tables 5 and 6, which dis-
play the DID estimators for these models, provide little evidence that the 
 follow-up period affects the results. All of the coefficients are statistically 
indistinguishable from 0. The models that use 18-year-olds as controls 
have similar coefficients for the 12-, 18-, and 24-month follow-up pe-
riods, although the coefficients for the 6-month follow-up period differ 
somewhat. The models that use 16-year-olds as controls provide much 
Table 4. Models for Any Rearrest, with 16-Year-Olds as Controls
Full 
(N = 21,943)
Age Limited 
(N = 3,653)
Time Limited 
(N = 3,609)
Variable b P b P b P
Intercept .742** 0 .759** 0 .739** 0
(.006) (.015) (.015)
[.754] [.788] [.769]
Age17 .011 .157 −.007 .706 .019 .361
(.008) (.020) (.021)
[.027] [.031] [.06]
Year2010 .005 .585 −.02 .334 −.018 .392
(.009) (.021) (.021)
[.022] [.021] [.024]
Age17 × Year2010 .009 .442 .037 .201 −.004 .885
(.012) (.029) (.029)
[.032] [.093] [.053]
Note. Standard errors are in parentheses. Values in brackets represent the upper bound of 
the 95 percent confidence interval for the coefficient.
** P < .01.
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
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less evidence that the follow-up period affects the results, particularly for 
the age- and time-limited models, which provide the cleanest counterfac-
tuals.
In addition, we examined the average number of arrests for 16-, 17-, 
and 18-year-olds to see if the volume of age-specific reoffending was no-
ticeably different after the change in law. Reported in Table A8 in the on-
line appendix, these average rates of rearrest suggest that the age- specific 
incidence of arrest was stable.
As a further sensitivity analysis, we reestimate our models to examine 
the effect of raising the age of majority on rearrests for violent crimes. 
Table 7 reports the results using 18-year-olds as controls. In the full 
model, the coefficient is .00 and statistically insignificant. The age- and 
time- limited models estimate slightly different coefficients, but both are 
between .01 and −.01 and statistically insignificant. For the comparison 
with 16- and 17-year-olds, reported in Table 8, the estimate for the full 
Figure 5. Time until rearrest: 17- and 16-year-olds within 60 days of their 17th birthday
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
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model is .01 and statistically insignificant. The estimates in both the age- 
and time-limited models are larger in magnitude, but they remain statis-
tically insignificant. These models provide little evidence of an effect and, 
if anything, suggest that the change in law resulted in a slight increase in 
Table 5. Rearrests with Alternative Follow-up Periods, with 18-Year-Olds as Controls
Full 
(N = 23,576)
Age Limited 
(N = 4,009)
Time Limited 
(N = 3,566)
Period b P b P b P
6 Months −.022 .085 −.047 .139 −.010 .771
(.013) (.032) (.034)
[.003] [.016] [.057]
12 Months −.001 .956 .001 .962 −.041 .204
(.012) (.030) (.032)
[.022] [.060] [.022]
18 Months .004 .756 .007 .809 −.046 .14
(.012) (.029) (.031)
[.028] [.064] [.015]
24 Months .010 .366 .020 .325 −.044 .138
(.011) (.027) (.030)
[.032] [.073] [.015]
Note. Standard errors are in parentheses. Values in brackets represent the upper bound of 
the 95 percent confidence interval for the coefficient.
Table 6. Rearrests with Alternative Follow-up Periods, with 16-Year-Olds as Controls
Full 
(N = 21,943)
Age Limited 
(N = 3,653)
Time Limited 
(N = 3,609)
Period b P b P b P
6 Months −.012 .369 .032 .336 .000 .993
(.014) (.033) (.033)
[.015] [.097] [.066]
12 Months −.002 .847 .031 .319 −.005 .882
(.013) (.032) (.032)
[.023] [.094] [.058]
18 Months .005 .654 .036 .225 .000 .991
(.012) (.030) (.031)
[.029] [.095] [.062]
24 Months .009 .442 .037 .201 −.004 .885
(.012) (.029) (.029)
[.033] [.094] [.053]
Note. Standard errors are in parentheses. Values in brackets represent the upper bound of 
the 95 percent confidence interval for the coefficient.
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
Table 7. Rearrests for Violent Crimes, with 18-Year-Olds as Controls
Full 
(N = 23,576)
Age Limited 
(N = 4,009)
Time Limited 
(N = 3,566)
Variable b P b P b P
Intercept .246** .000 .253** .000 .253** .000
(.006) (.014) (.016)
[.257] [.28] [.284]
Age17 .054** .000 .04* .043 .046* .033
(.008) (.020) (.022)
[.07] [.078] [.089]
Year2010 .019* .021 .022 .264 .011 .629
(.008) (.020) (.022)
[.036] [.061] [.054]
Age17 × Year2010 .000 .972 .005 .848 −.006 .851
(.012) (.029) (.030)
[.023] [.061] [.054]
Note. Standard errors are in parentheses. Values in brackets represent the upper bound of 
the 95 percent confidence interval for the coefficient.
* P < .05.
** P < .01.
Table 8. Rearrests for Violent Crimes, with 16-Year-Olds as Controls
Full 
(N = 21,943)
Age Limited 
(N = 3,653)
Time Limited 
(N = 3,609)
Variable b P b P b P
Intercept .364** .000 .351** .000 .384** .000
(.007) (.016) (.016)
[.377] [.382] [.416]
Age17 −.064** .000 −.053* .013 −.085** .000
(.009) (.022) (.022)
[−.047] [−.011] [−.042]
Year2010 .005 .623 .01 .678 −.052* .023
(.009) (.023) (.023)
[.023] [.055] [−.007]
Age17 × Year2010 .014 .266 .055 .081 .057 .07
(.013) (.031) (.031)
[.039] [.117] [.118]
Note. Standard errors are in parentheses. Values in brackets represent the upper bound of 
the 95 percent confidence interval for the coefficient.
* P < .05.
** P < .01.
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
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rearrests for violent crimes if we apply a less stringent standard of statis-
tical significance.
Taken together, our results provide little evidence of a change in re-
cidivism after the law went into effect. The most plausible explanation is 
that the law had no effect. But it is also possible that the law had multiple 
countervailing effects of similar magnitude that mask each other. For ex-
ample, processing 17-year-old offenders for misdemeanors in the juvenile 
system may decrease deterrence while increasing incapacitation. To test 
this hypothesis, we refit our models to subsets of the sample with dif-
ferent levels of criminal history and instant offenses. The rate of pretrial 
detention is very low for both juvenile and adult arrestees for misdemean-
ors who have no criminal history, but we suspect that pretrial detention 
rates may differ more dramatically for juveniles and adults with longer 
criminal histories. In Tables 9 and 10, we refit our models to groups with 
different levels of criminal history. While the estimates are less precise, 
they provide little evidence of treatment effect heterogeneity across crimi-
nal histories. We found similar results for models estimated across instant 
offense categories (see Tables A9 and A10 in the online appendix). This 
finding, combined with the similar timing of rearrest in our hazard mod-
els, reinforces our conclusion that the law had no effect on recidivism.
5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
After an extended period of contraction at the end of the 20th century, a 
number of states expanded the jurisdiction of the juvenile court by raising 
the age of majority to 18. Proponents argue that these legislative changes 
reduce juvenile recidivism, and they cite the continued decline in juvenile 
crime as evidence that they do not harm public safety. Critics, in con-
trast, voice concerns about the cost of juvenile processing and the risk 
of increased crime. To date, no empirical study has systematically tested 
whether raising the age of majority has an effect on juvenile offending.
The present study examines the effect on recidivism of a 2010 Illi-
nois law that raised the age of majority for misdemeanor crimes from 17 
to 18. Using a DID design, we compare the change in recidivism among 
17-year-old arrestees before and after 2010 with the change in recidivism
among 16- and 18-year-old arrestees (who were unaffected by the law
change) during that period. Our results consistently show no statistically
significant effect.
Some of our estimated effects are sufficiently imprecise to leave room 
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for a change in recidivism in the high single-digit range, which is still 
below the double-digit estimates commonly cited in the raise-the-age de-
bate (for example, Deitch, Breeden, and Weingarten 2012; Henrichson 
and Levshin 2011; Roman 2006). But several elements of our findings 
Table 9. Rearrests by Criminal History, with 18-Year-Olds as Controls
All 
(N = 4,009)
No Priors 
(N = 788)
1–2 Priors 
(N = 897)
3–10 Priors 
(N = 1,551)
Variable b P b P b P b P
Intercept .742** .000 .311** .000 .687** .000 .883** .000
(.013) (.033) (.032) (.015)
[.768] [.376] [.750] [.913]
Age17 −.005 .808 .058 .210 −.052 .242 .01 .633
(.019) (.046) (.045) (.022)
[.032] [.149] [.035] [.053]
Year2010 .011 .553 .052 .279 −.031 .485 .018 .415
(.019) (.048) (.045) (.022)
[.049] [.147] [.056] [.061]
Age17 × Year2010 .027 .325 .039 .569 .054 .400 −.017 .585
(.027) (.069) (.064) (.032)
[.081] [.175] [.178] [.045]
Note. Standard errors are in parentheses. Values in brackets represent the upper bound of 
the 95 percent confidence interval for the coefficient.
** P < .01.
Table 10. Rearrests by Criminal History, with 16-Year-Olds as Controls
All 
(N = 3,653)
No Priors 
(N = 893)
1–2 Priors 
(N = 951)
3–10 Priors 
(N = 1,397)
Variable b P b P b P b P
Intercept .759** .000 .447** .000 .727** .000 .93** .000
(.015) (.033) (.032) (.015)
[.788] [.512] [.789] [.959]
Age17 −.007 .706 .013 .776 −.016 .692 −.016 .418
(.020) (.045) (.041) (.020)
[.031] [.102] [.064] [.023]
Year2010 −.02 .334 −.004 .932 −.057 .188 −.014 .525
(.021) (.049) (.044) (.022)
[.021] [.092] [.028] [.029]
Age17 × Year2010 .037 .201 −.012 .862 .07 .242 .011 .711
(.029) (.067) (.060) (.030)
[.093] [.12] [.187] [.069]
Note. Standard errors are in parentheses. Values in brackets represent the upper bound of 
the 95 percent confidence interval for the coefficient.
** P < .01.
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
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suggest that the best interpretation is that the law had little or no effect. 
First, across a wide range of specifications, the estimated effects are near 
0, which gives greater weight to the conclusion of no effect. Second, most 
of our estimates are positive, particularly in our preferred age-restricted 
models. If anything, we suspect that the change in law would bias our es-
timates upward by discouraging officers from arresting 17-year-olds for 
less serious offenses, making them subject to the juvenile system and, as a 
result, producing a pool of arrested 17-year-olds with more serious crim-
inal histories. This would mean that the true effects are even closer to 0 
than our estimates imply.
Our findings support at least two theoretical interpretations. First, it is 
possible that raising the age of majority has little effect on the recidivism 
of older juveniles and those with less serious offenses in the short term 
but does affect their recidivism later. The effect of the law may, for ex-
ample, be delayed until offenders enter the workforce and fare better on 
the job market because their offenses are not in publicly available crim-
inal records. While this is certainly possible, we observe recidivism over 
2 years, which provides time for the 16-, 17-, and 18-year-old subjects 
to enter the job market. Still, a longer follow-up period of 3 or 4 years 
would help resolve this question.
Second, raising the age of majority may simply have little effect on re-
cidivism for older juveniles and those with less serious offenses. One pos-
sible explanation is that the rehabilitative services provided in the juvenile 
system and the more punitive treatment in the adult system have little ef-
fect on recidivism. Another explanation is that the offenders in our sam-
ple received similar rehabilitative services and punishment in the juvenile 
and adult systems. Indeed, scholars have found mixed evidence on the 
relative severity of punishment in the juvenile and adult systems (Fagan 
1996; Kurlychek and Johnson 2004; Lemmon et al. 2005), which leads 
some to conclude that these two systems differ more in their procedural 
elements than in their substantive effects (Feld 1999). It is particularly 
plausible that the subjects in our sample—older adolescents who commit 
less serious crimes—receive similar treatment in the juvenile and adult 
systems. However, to fully resolve these theoretical issues, additional re-
search with detailed data on diversion and treatment programs in the ju-
venile and adult systems is needed.
Our results are consistent with and reinforce previous evaluations of 
legislative changes to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. This work, 
which has been largely unmentioned during recent policy debates on 
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raise-the-age legislation, finds little consistent evidence that changing the 
jurisdiction of the juvenile court affects the aggregate offending rate of 
all juveniles—an unsurprising finding given that most juveniles are prob-
ably unaware of such legislation. As noted earlier, if raise-the-age legis-
lation has any effect on juvenile offending, there are strong theoretical 
reasons to expect it to be larger for the subset of juveniles who are ar-
rested and processed (and who thus experience firsthand the effects of 
the legislation). Juvenile arrests require parental notification, while adult 
arrests do not. Juvenile arrests are less likely to involve temporary deten-
tion and more likely to lead to community-based intervention. Juvenile 
arrest and adjudication records are sealed by default, while adult records 
of arrest and adjudication are a matter of public record (Illinois Juve-
nile Justice Commission 2013). And yet our findings provide little evi-
dence of a change in offending, even for juveniles who are arrested. This 
may result from the fact that most misdemeanor arrestees—whether they 
are processed in the juvenile or adult system—are likely to be released 
within hours of arrest and to receive diversion or community supervision 
rather than prison time (Cook County Juvenile Court 2010). Whether 
mis demeanor and juvenile courts have more in common with each other 
than felony and juvenile courts do, the fast failure of so many subjects in 
our sample suggests that whether misdemeanor arrestees are processed in 
the juvenile or adult system makes little difference for recidivism.
At first glance, our results are harder to reconcile with the literature 
on juvenile transfer, which has repeatedly found higher rates of recidi-
vism among juveniles transferred to the adult system—a finding that has 
served as the empirical basis for claims that raising the age of majority 
lowers juvenile recidivism rates. We offer several potential explanations. 
First, the studies in this literature focus on serious felonies, which are 
relatively rare among juveniles. Our analysis focuses on misdemeanor of-
fenders, who account for the vast majority of juvenile offenders. Moving 
these offenders with less serious crimes into or out of the juvenile system 
may not have the same effect on recidivism. Second, the transfer literature 
focuses on the effects of processing individual offenders in one system or 
the other. It is possible that a legislative enactment that moves thousands 
of juveniles from one system to the other all at once has a different effect. 
Finally, consistent with our findings, some recent studies find little evi-
dence of an effect even for juveniles with more serious offenses (Lee and 
McCrary 2009; Hjalmarsson 2009). It is possible that these studies pro-
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vide a stronger estimate of the effect of processing juveniles as adults by 
avoiding selection problems.
The present study is subject to several important limitations. First, our 
analysis focuses on one city, which suggests the need for broader analy-
ses in Illinois and elsewhere. Jurisdictions with greater treatment differ-
entials between their juvenile and adult justice systems may experience a 
larger effect from raise-the-age legislation. Second, our analysis focuses 
on recidivism because public safety plays a central role in the national 
policy debate on the age of majority. Our study, therefore, leaves open 
many questions about the effect of raising the age of majority on other 
life-course outcomes such as employment and health. Third, the present 
investigation examines only misdemeanor offenders. We are therefore un-
able to draw conclusions about the effect of raising the age of majority 
on felony offenders. Future research may extend our work to felonies by 
examining other legislative changes. In 2014, for example, Illinois raised 
the age of majority for felonies from 17 to 18. Connecticut offers another 
natural experiment, as it raised the age of majority for all crimes from 16 
to 17 in 2010 and then from 17 to 18 in 2012.
Finally, our study lacks data on sentences received by offenders in our 
sample. This is a common problem in the literature (Bishop et al. 1996; 
Lee and McCrary 2009), at least partly because juvenile court data are 
difficult to access. Such data would provide only limited value to our 
analysis anyway. Because sentencing in juvenile court is indeterminate, 
sentencing data would provide little information about the length of time 
subjects spend behind bars.
In concluding, we note that our preferred interpretation of our analy-
sis—that raising the age of majority has no effect on criminal recidivism, 
at least for lower-level offenders—helps resolve a key empirical question 
at the heart of the national debate on the age of majority. Yet our find-
ings cannot fully resolve the normative question of whether states should 
raise the age of majority. Even if there is no effect on recidivism, we sus-
pect that raising the age of majority results in benefits for other important 
life-course outcomes related to employment, health, life satisfaction, and 
victimization. And processing adolescents in the juvenile system may be 
fairer if adolescents are less culpable than adults for their crimes.
The wisdom of raising the age of majority may hinge on the values 
and financial resources of each state contemplating such a change. Since 
raising the age of majority for misdemeanors appears to pose little threat 
to public safety, states that value retaining adolescents in the juvenile jus-
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tice system should continue or begin doing so. Similarly, since raising the 
age of majority is unlikely to increase crime rates, states that do not value 
the approach of the juvenile justice system or do not have the requisite 
resources may retain or lower their current ages of majority for misde-
meanors without adversely affecting juvenile crime, as Rhode Island did 
when it temporarily lowered its age of majority in pursuit of cost savings.
For policy makers seeking reductions in juvenile crime, it may prove 
useful to consider other policy alternatives that have a greater chance of 
reducing recidivism. These initiatives include cognitive behavioral therapy 
in juvenile justice settings (Heller et al. 2011; Landenberger and Lipsey 
2005) and a regime of swift, certain, and fair sanctions (Hawken and 
Kleiman 2009; Bonnie et al. 2013). The latter has shown success among 
adults and is currently being tested in the juvenile system.
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